Performing for pay? The effects of 'merit pay' on motivation in a public service by Marsden, David & Richardson, Ray
  
David Marsden and Ray Richardson 
Performing for pay? The effects of 'merit 
pay' on motivation in a public service 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: 
Marsden, David and Richardson, Ray (1994) Performing for pay? The effects of 'merit pay' on 
motivation in a public service. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 32 (2). pp. 243-261. ISSN 
1467-8543 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8543.1994.tb01043.x 
 
© 1994 Blackwell 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/4030/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: January 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
  
 
1 
 
Performing for pay? The effects of 'merit pay' on motivation  
in a public service. 
 
David Marsden and Ray Richardson 
London School of Economics and Centre for Economic Performance 
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Introduction. 
 
Performance related pay has been very strongly on the increase in the UK, in both the 
private and public sectors. In the private sector, where it has long been a feature of 
managerial pay, it is being extended to a much wider range of occupations. In the public 
sector too, a large variety of performance related pay systems can be discerned and, over 
the last few years, they have been extended to practically the whole of the Civil Service. 
There also seems to be no prospect that the present Government will back-off from 
performance related pay. Although the extension of the new arrangements may have been 
somewhat retarded by the 1.5% public sector pay limit in the 1992/3 pay round and the 
prospective wage bill freeze in 1993/4, the Government has given no public indication of 
any shift in its view that extending performance related pay is an integral part of its policy 
of improving public services. 
 
Given this, it is only natural to ask whether the recent experiments in performance related 
pay in the public sector have been successful. This, surprisingly, seems to be a question 
which has rarely been addressed with any seriousness, whether in the UK (Cannell and 
Wood 1992, Thompson, 1992), or even in the US, where performance related pay in the 
Federal civil service has been in use for much longer (Milkovitch and Wigdor, 1991). In 
particular, although there exist a small number of evaluations of schemes for managerial 
staff,
2
 we know of no evaluation study of PRP for public service non-managerial staff, for 
whom PRP is a relatively new practice.  
 
Despite the growing use made of a whole range of performance related schemes, their 
true impact remains largely a mystery. This article, a case study of the scheme introduced 
into the Inland Revenue in 1988, is an attempt to reduce the area of mystery. The scheme 
is a fairly typical UK public sector performance pay scheme, and  conforms to many of 
the canons of good practice as outlined by ACAS (1990). 
 
We begin by describing the scheme, and then go on to discuss some evaluation 
difficulties. There is more than one way in which to seek to evaluate performance related 
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pay. Many studies have focused on schemes in organisations where output can be 
measured objectively. But most of the PRP schemes spreading through the public services 
rely on subjective measures based on staff appraisal of one kind or another (Milkovitch 
and Wigdor 1991). Because of the specifics of the Inland Revenue situation, we were not 
able to gauge the impact of its scheme on any objective measure of employee 
performance. We therefore had recourse to its likely impact on employee motivation, 
which we assess through a variety of employee and management opinions and attitudes, 
as expressed in the more than 2,000 responses to a questionnaire we distributed. Our 
conclusion is that performance pay in the Inland Revenue is very unlikely to have 
significantly raised employee motivation, indeed may, on balance, have been 
demotivating. If it did not improve employee motivation it is hard to see how the scheme 
could have enhanced employee performance.
3
 
 
 
Performance Pay 
 
Performance Related Pay was introduced in the Inland Revenue in the 1988 Pay 
Agreement.
4
  This scheme, known as Performance Pay, was a form of merit pay, under 
which staff could be awarded either accelerated increments or 'range points', i.e. up to 
three increments added on to the top of the incremental scale. An award rested on 
judgments about a staff member's performance made through a system of staff appraisal, 
the version of which that was in operation at the time of the research dating from the mid-
1980s. Under this, individual staff were annually rated on a scale of one to five, the so-
called "Box markings". Staff getting a Box 1, the top score, received an accelerated 
increment if they were not already at the top of their scale, and a 'range point' if they were 
at the top of the scale. Staff who got two consecutive Box 2s could also get an award, but 
only if they were already at the top of their scale; they then moved up the equivalent of 
half an increment 
5
. The main difference between the Inland Revenue scheme and similar 
ones for non-managerial employees in other parts of the civil service was that it restricted 
awards to those who had obtained a Box 2 or above (see, Kessler 1993). 
 
The size of the increment varied by grade. For the lowest grades, Typists and Revenue 
Assistants, the maximum reward for sustained outstanding performance under the scheme 
was a pay rise of 22% for a succession of Box 1s. For the intermediate grades of Revenue 
Officers and Revenue Executives, the corresponding increases were 20% and 15% 
respectively, while Inspectors could earn an extra 12%. A succession of six Box 2s could 
qualify for roughly half these amounts.
6
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This form of reward meant that performance related pay elements were virtually 
permanent, i.e. were analogous to normal service-related increments. They could in 
principle be withdrawn after a period of unsatisfactory performance but this was, 
apparently, almost unknown. 
 
The appraisal system which was linked to this scheme involved a number of stages. First 
there was an annual discussion of individual work objectives (the 'job plan') for the  
coming year between each member of staff and his or her immediate supervisor, the 
'Reporting Officer'. Secondly, there was supposed to be frequent review of achievements 
in relation to this job plan, which could in turn have led to the plan being revised. Finally, 
the Reporting Officer was asked to rate the performance of the staff member at the end of 
the year according to as many as thirteen work related criteria. These ratings, plus 
impressions from the preceding discussions concerning the job plan, then provided a 
basis for the overall Box marking of the member of staff.
7
 
 
An important check on the whole process was provided by the "Counter-signing Officer" 
who had to vet the reports of each Reporting Officer, and who might ask for justification 
of particular Box markings given. Clearly, this made it possible to achieve consistency in 
appraisal standards among Reporting Officers, but staff could also have felt that it 
enabled management to overrule the award of good Box markings for reasons that had 
nothing to do with individual performance, for example, concern at the size of the overall 
wage bill. 
 
The 1988 Pay Agreement which introduced Performance Pay reflected the Government's 
wish to control public expenditure. It therefore set a ceiling (para 13 vi) on the total 
amount which the Revenue could award each year for Performance Pay; "it is expected 
that if reporting and marking criteria are properly observed the cost [of Performance Pay] 
will not exceed (nor fall substantially short of) the cost of giving 25 per cent of the staff 
in the grades covered a range increase on the spine which they are on..". This statement 
perhaps reflects a lack of self-confidence in the principle of performance related pay but it 
is not an unusual feature of such initiatives. Cost ceilings of a similar magnitude were 
applied to a number of other Civil Service performance related pay schemes in force at 
that time. 
 
In the year of our study, between about 30% and 15% of staff in the grades organised by 
the Inland Revenue Staff Federation (IRSF) were in receipt of Performance Pay, although 
percentages varied by grade: about 30% of Revenue Executives, and about 15% of 
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Revenue Assistants were getting it, with Inspectors and Revenue Officers in an 
intermediate position. 
 
The design of the Inland Revenue scheme was in certain respects a considerable 
improvement on some earlier public service schemes. Unlike that introduced in 1987 for 
the 90,000 scientific and professional civil servants represented by the IPMS, for 
example, the Inland Revenue scheme had firm criteria for making awards, and was based 
on 'open reporting', with agreed work targets and staff being told the result of their 
appraisals (Kessler 1990). 
 
 
Some evaluation issues. 
 
In this study we are treating the new payment system as a management initiative and 
asking whether it was a success from management's point of view. The straightforward 
approach would therefore be to establish management's objectives for the scheme and 
then see whether these were realised. Unfortunately, management's objectives are not 
easily established. Indeed, it is far from certain that the Inland Revenue management 
themselves were enthusiastic about Performance Pay when it was introduced. It might 
well be the case that the drive to have performance related pay came much more from the 
Treasury or some other part of the centre. Certainly there were no objectives in the 1988 
Pay Agreement itself which were explicitly tied to Performance Pay.  
 
The very title of the scheme, however, means that management must have been hoping to 
use pay as an incentive to raise performance in some way. The logic of the scheme further 
implies that the performance in question must have been reflected in the appraisal 
process, for it was this which determined the making of awards.
8
  There is a difficulty 
here in that there were no fewer than thirteen work related elements referred to in the 
appraisal, not all of which were relevant to all employees and each of which may have 
had a different weight for the different grades. There is no source of objective evidence, 
certainly not one available to us, that would allow any monitoring of behaviour with 
respect to these thirteen elements. It was therefore not possible for us to evaluate the 
scheme by examining employee behaviour directly. 
 
It was possible, however, to follow an indirect route. It would be very widely agreed that, 
from a management perspective, introducing any scheme of performance related pay 
makes little sense unless it motivates staff to work better in some respect or other. It is 
implausible, for example, that its objective would be simply to reward past performance, 
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unless this were also thought to encourage better performance in the future. The central 
justification for performance related pay must surely be that it somehow acts as a 
motivator. 
 
Better motivation does not automatically translate into better performance. Revenue staff 
might be highly motivated but still perform badly because of a range of impediments, e.g. 
poor management, inadequate training or obsolete equipment. Motivation, then, is 
something that can lead to better performance, but only when other conditions are met. 
We treat it as a willingness or preparedness to do something, which means that it is a state 
of mind. Sometimes, researchers make inferences about levels of motivation purely by 
observing performance. This can be legitimate but, equally, can lead to difficulties when 
other things are changing at the same time and are independently affecting performance. 
We have chosen a different approach and have sought to measure possible changes in 
motivation from the responses of staff to a variety of statements about themselves and 
their fellow employees.  
 
The second problem is motivation to do what? Given the detail in the appraisal process it 
was felt appropriate to ask staff about most of the thirteen aspects of performance 
included there. Some of these aspects were seen to be more important than others. 
Discussions with a variety of people in the IRSF and the Revenue led us to the view that 
the two most important dimensions of performance for appraisal purposes were very 
widely thought to be the quantity and the quality of the work done, but we explored a 
number of the others too. We also looked for motivational change with respect to some 
aspects of performance not specifically located in the appraisal form.  
 
We have therefore not sought directly to connect the new payment system to changes in 
employee behaviour. We have instead tried to establish whether Performance Pay 
changed staff motivation, as measured by the opinions and beliefs of the staff involved. 
These, of course, are not objective data but it is our judgment that they give a reliable 
indication of at least some of the motivational impact of the scheme.  
 
 
Data collection 
 
Our work was initially stimulated by an approach from the IRSF.
9
  A draft questionnaire 
was piloted on, and small group discussions were held with, about 40 Revenue staff at 
one of their offices. In the summer of 1991 the questionnaire was sent to 4,000 Revenue 
staff in the grades represented by the IRSF. The returns were anonymous and 
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confidential, and were returned in sealed envelopes via the Revenue's internal postal 
system but addressed to us at the LSE. All the returned questionnaires that reached us did 
so in unopened envelopes and there is no reason to believe that the replies were 
influenced by the possibility of favourable or unfavourable judgments from either 
management or the IRSF. 
 
Of the 4,000 questionnaires sent out, 2,423 usable questionnaires were returned, giving a 
sample response rate of slightly above 60%. This is a very satisfactory response rate, 
especially as it was not practical to send out reminders, and it may well reflect the interest 
which staff had in the issues being explored. Two sampling decisions were made prior to 
drawing the sample. First, the survey was confined to staff in the two largest sections of 
the Revenue, Taxes and Collection; the remaining sections are relatively small, which is 
why they were omitted from the survey, but in what follows their omission could 
conceivably be important. It must be noted, however, that our results very strongly 
suggest that staff views on the impact of Performance Pay are not different as between 
Taxes and Collection. We therefore feel more confident that the omission of the other 
Sections does not lead to any significant overall distortion. The second sampling decision 
was to sample the different job grades disproportionately, taking a higher fraction of staff 
in the smaller grades. This was done in order to maximise the chance of obtaining 
statistically significant results with respect to job grade within our overall sample size. It 
also turned out that response rate to the survey varied by job grade, with higher response 
rates coming from more senior staff. In order to obtain a representative picture of all staff 
in the population, therefore, the results were subsequently re-weighted to compensate 
both for the oversampling and for the differential response rates. All the results reported 
below use the re-weighted data. 
 
Overall, the sample provides a good fit of the population values according to a number of 
characteristics of the Revenue's staff that could be checked independently (grade, gender, 
length of service, region and section). Also, and most importantly, there seems to be a 
good fit by Box marking, which suggests that the staff who replied had neither done 
particularly well nor particularly badly in comparison with staff as a whole. There seems 
to be no reason to doubt the representativeness of our data, whether by employment 
characteristics or by experience of the Performance Pay mechanics. 
 
It is perhaps necessary to justify further our use of attitudes and opinions, and our 
concentration on the inherent characteristics of the scheme rather than its organisational 
and managerial context. Our survey recorded employee opinions and attitudes concerning 
their experience of PRP after the scheme had been in operation for two years. They had 
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therefore had long enough to become acquainted with it, and to have formed reasoned 
judgments about it. Although only a 'snapshot', our wide sample, pilot discussions, and 
interviews with senior management and IRSF staff gave no reason to believe that the 
views reported had been unduly influenced by external events, or that they might change 
radically without a change in the system.  
 
An alternative method would have been to use a 'before' and 'after' study of motivation. 
This was not possible for us, because it would have had to start before implementation of 
the 1988 agreement. In any case, one cannot sensibly ask employees' detailed views of a 
particular scheme's effects on their own motivation before they have experienced it. 
Instead, we chose to infer the effects of PRP upon motivation from employees' judgments 
of their personal experience, and those of their reporting officers. 
 
It would undoubtedly have been interesting to gather data also on objective measures of 
performance. But these were not available, and, certainly for many aspects on the 
appraisal forms, even the Inland Revenue did not keep them. We therefore confine our 
study to the first link in the chain between PRP and performance, namely, whether it 
increased employees' willingness to provide better performance. 
 
The political and managerial contexts in which an agreement or a pay scheme are 
introduced may sometimes be important influences on how they work in practice. A 
unilaterally imposed suspension of long-accepted comparability or consensus could make 
workers resent a new scheme, and so see it as unfair, irrespective of its inherent merits. 
Kessler (1990) argued that the IPMS PRP scheme had been introduced in 'piecemeal and 
"half-hearted" way' because of union opposition, and that this was the reason for its poor 
results. We believe that such factors, although not entirely absent, were less important in 
determining the outcome at the Inland Revenue. 
 
First, although the IRSF negotiators were told that unless they accepted PRP there would 
be no pay agreement, there is nothing unusual in negotiations for one or other side to 
issue such warnings. Indeed, the union's policy was to accept the scheme and work for its 
improvement. Secondly, despite union reservations, the scheme was more coherent and 
closer to the standard of best practice recommended by ACAS (1990) than the IPMS one. 
Thirdly, the results of our own survey showed that a clear majority of the staff agreed 
with the principle of PRP, and so presumably saw little reason to oppose it. There 
remains the budgetary constraint which led management to adopt a quota on payments, 
but such pressures are a normal part of any pay régime. It seems, therefore, that the 
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politics of its introduction did not greatly distort the working of the scheme at the Inland 
Revenue. 
 
 
What do Revenue staff think about the principle of Performance Pay? 
 
Some workers are suspicious of, or hostile to, the principle of relating some part of their 
pay to performance. Others see nothing wrong with it or are actively in favour. Our first 
task was to gauge the views of the Revenue staff on this issue of principle. Table 1 
highlights some of our results.
10
 
 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
These results are not far out of line with those in the Next Steps report, which reported 
that 70% of Civil Servants supported the general principle of rewarding good 
performance with better pay (Next Steps, para 17). Revenue staff look to be somewhat 
less favourably inclined than this but, on balance, were clearly in favour of the principle 
of some link between pay and performance. As is documented below, however, many of 
them had deep reservations about the operation of these links in the Revenue scheme. It 
may well be that these reservations caused some people to be more hostile to the principle 
than they would have been if the operation of the Revenue scheme was seen to be more 
satisfactory. This interpretation is supported by the different response to the first two 
statements in Table 1. The second statement effectively asks respondents to take both 
principle and practice into account, and generates less support for Performance Pay. 
 
It is also worth emphasising that a significant minority of Revenue staff had very strong 
objections to the principle of performance related pay. Those who expressed strong 
disagreement with the principle of Performance Pay in the above statements were always 
more numerous than those who expressed strong agreement. 
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Our first conclusion is that a majority of Revenue staff supported the principle of 
Performance Pay but that a significant minority felt very hostile to it. 
 
 
Did Performance Pay motivate staff at the Inland Revenue? 
 
In seeking to establish how people felt the scheme had changed their motivation to 
perform at work, the relevant section of the questionnaire started with the following 
preamble: Now we would like to know how the existence of the Performance Pay 
arrangements have affected you personally. There followed a set of sixteen statements 
which the respondent was asked to comment on. The sixteen reflected the content of the 
appraisal form plus a few other possible forms of behaviour. A typical statement was as 
follows: the existence of Performance Pay has made me willing to increase the quantity of 
the work I do. Table 2 provides a summary of the overall responses to some of the 
statements. 
 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
We also asked a general question about whether people thought that Performance Pay had 
significantly raised their motivation at work. 12% said that it had, while 76% said that it 
had not. 
 
It is clear from these results that, on their own assessment, relatively few Inland Revenue 
staff members felt that Performance Pay had provided them with an incentive, or a 
motivation, to change their behaviour at work at all significantly. The results are 
especially disappointing for the crucial areas of motivating staff to improve the quality 
and quantity of their work, with fewer than 15% perceiving any positive change. It is also 
notable that staff felt that Performance Pay had had a negligible effect in motivating them 
to become more effective in their dealings with the public, with only 9% seeing a change. 
This last result is potentially of importance because of the Government's hopes laid out in 
the Citizens' Charter. 
 
Not all groups of staff had quite the same reactions to Performance Pay. It was easy for us 
to look at the differential responses by sex, grade, length of service and whether the staff 
member had received a Performance Pay award. The overall picture is that although, on 
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our measures, Performance Pay did have some differential motivational effects amongst 
groups, in no case was there a profound positive effect. Those who were most strongly 
affected in a positive direction were the most junior grades, and those with the shortest 
service. However, even among these groups, the majority of staff replied that there had 
been no motivational effect to most of the questions. Among the more senior grades and 
the longer serving staff, the effects on motivation were generally the weakest, and the 
reports of jealousy and lower morale associated with Performance Pay were the most 
frequent.
11
 
 
It is possible that individuals are not always the best judges of their own behaviour, or 
indeed of their motivation. An alternative source of evidence is the judgement of those 
Inland Revenue staff who have to carry out staff appraisals, i.e. the Reporting Officers. 
We asked these, about 20% of our total sample, to respond to a number of statements on 
how they thought Performance Pay had affected staff. The results are highlighted in Table 
3. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
These results certainly give no comfort to those who feel that staff might understate the 
extent of positive motivational change. They fully confirm the earlier findings that 
Performance Pay had a very limited effect on positively motivating Inland Revenue staff. 
Indeed, the Reporting Officers were, if anything, even more sceptical of the system's 
success in this respect. Only on the impact of Performance Pay on the quantity of work 
done were Reporting Officers more sanguine than staff as a whole, and even there the 
difference was unimpressive. 
 
So far we have been looking for the existence of positive motivational effects. There 
must, however, be the possibility that at least some Revenue staff found the new 
arrangements to be actually demotivating. This might have happened because some 
thought the whole principle unfair or because they felt, rightly or wrongly, that they had 
been cheated out of an award to which they were entitled. One pointer in this direction is 
the element of strong disagreement with the principle of Performance Pay, noted above in 
the discussion of Table 1. Another might be inferred from the detailed results lying 
behind that Table. If someone disagrees with a statement that Performance Pay has had a 
positive motivational effect, he or she might believe either that it has no effect at all or 
that it has a negative, demotivating one. Those who just express disagreement might feel 
that it has had no effect. Those who express strong disagreement may well be indicating 
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the stronger, negative effect of demotivation. It is notable that for many of the statements 
in Table 1, the number of people who expressed strong disagreement exceeded the total 
of those who expressed any measure of agreement at all. We would not wish to push this 
inferential line of reasoning too far but neither do we think that it is entirely without 
force. 
 
The likelihood of an element of demotivation is also indicated by the responses to some 
of the statements elsewhere in the questionnaire where we asked staff to respond to a 
series of statements about the effect of Performance Pay not on themselves but on staff as 
a whole. Some highlights are given in Table 4. 
 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
With a majority agreeing that the scheme had undermined morale or caused jealousies 
between staff, and a quarter agreeing that Performance Pay had made staff less willing to 
assist one another, the likelihood of some element of counter-productive demotivation is 
evident.  
 
Our overall conclusion is that the positive motivational effects of Performance Pay, as it 
was practised up to the time of our research, were at most very modest. It is hard to see 
that they had been felt to any degree by more than a small minority of staff. Further, the 
number who felt motivated to a powerful degree, as shown by the number who expressed 
strong agreement with any of the relevant statements, was always negligible. Even worse, 
there is clear evidence of some demotivaton. Although we cannot be sure of this, it would 
be very easy to conclude that the net motivational effect was, although small, actually 
negative. 
 
 
What explains the motivational impact of Performance Pay? 
 
There are many strands in the academic literature purporting to explain motivation and 
employee performance, or the lack of it. Our data allow us to use two of these strands to 
shed light on why Performance Pay in the Revenue seems to have had such a 
disappointing motivational impact. 
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One strand, expectancy theory (see, e.g. Lawler, 1971), stresses the importance of a series 
of links between behaviour and the rewards accruing to that behaviour. For there to a be a 
heightened motivation to perform, someone:-  
(a) has to feel able to change his or her behaviour,  
(b) has to feel confident that a change in the behaviour will reliably produce the 
rewards, and  
(c) has to value the rewards sufficiently to justify the change in behaviour.  
Our results suggest that these three conditions are not all met for a large number of 
Revenue staff. Expectancy theory would therefore point to only modest motivational 
improvement, or to demotivation. 
 
Did staff feel they could change their behaviour? We asked whether individuals felt 
capable of doing what was necessary to get an overall Box 1 or 2 marking in the future. 
This, it will be recalled, was a necessary condition for a Performance Pay award to be 
made. Only 6% felt that they were not capable of such a performance level, as against 
81% who believed that they were. The first condition of expectancy theory was, therefore, 
clearly met.  
 
Were staff confident that a change in behaviour would reliably produce the rewards?  No 
fewer than 45% of our respondents were of the view that, even if their performance were 
good enough to merit a Box 1 or 2, it was doubtful that such a grading would be given; 
only 40% believed that a good enough performance would produce the correct Box 
Marking. This belief, whether justified or not, substantially reduces staff motivation to 
change their behaviour, and suggests a potent source of disillusion.  
 
Did staff value the rewards sufficiently? Obviously, most staff want the money that an 
award would bring. The key question is whether the amounts available justify, in their 
minds, the extra effort involved. Only 17% of our respondents felt that the financial 
reward from Performance Pay was a sufficient inducement for them to change their 
behaviour; 71% felt that it was insufficient. 
 
Thus, two of expectancy theory's three conditions were not met for the Revenue's system 
of Performance Pay, which provides a strong reason for its failure to motivate staff. Other 
findings from the survey re-inforce this conclusion and point to possible reforms that 
should be contemplated if motivational change is to be secured. Perhaps the single most 
important issue is not so much the amount of money involved but the way it is allocated 
via the appraisal system. 
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We asked a number of questions about the appraisal system in the Revenue. Table 5 
highlights some results. There is a consistency of response between these answers and 
those referring to individual feelings as to whether they would get the Box marking they 
felt they deserved if they were produce the appropriate performance. There was a 
widespread doubt about the fairness of the appraisal system. Worse, there was manifestly 
a view that the system of Performance Pay had undermined the integrity of the long-
standing and well-established appraisal system. As was noted above, the mechanics of 
Performance Pay were bolted on to the existing appraisal system. It is clear that very 
many staff felt that the appraisal system had been abused and that they were less likely to 
get the appropriate Box marking.  
 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
This belief is very likely to have been reinforced by the fact that the frequency of Box 1 
and 2s had fallen after 1988, for all grades. As an example, the proportion of staff on the 
Inspector (S) grade who were given a Box 1 fell from 12% in 1988 to only 5% in 1991; 
the corresponding figures for Box 2s were 63% and 43%.
12
  The reasons for these 
declines are not obvious but it seems extremely unlikely that they reflect a widespread 
deterioration in staff performance. It is true that Revenue staff had previously been paid 
somewhat more than comparable Civil Servants for a number of years; it is also true that 
Civil Service staff outside the Revenue seem often to qualify more easily for Performance 
Pay Awards, reflecting perhaps the different rules on performance related pay in their 
particular pay agreements. It is possible that the Revenue used its system of Performance 
Pay in part to deny high Box markings and control its wage bill more aggressively than 
other Civil Service employers.  
 
If this was so it must have been all the more damaging given the psychological 
importance staff attribute to their Box marking. 63% of our respondents agreed that the 
personal satisfaction they derived from work was a sufficient incentive for them to do 
what was necessary to get a Box 1 or 2; only 26% disagreed. The right Box marking was 
for many a highly important signal, confirming them in their self-esteem and in their 
belief that they were doing their work to the right level. For this to be jeopardised by a 
particular method of awarding performance related pay is potentially serious for 
management. 
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We are not claiming that the appraisal system necessarily was unfair, did operate a quota 
or was characterised by undue overruling from above. Our information does not permit us 
to make an authoritative judgment on these issues. But for staff motivation, what is 
important is what employees think, and their thoughts were heavily in a negative, cynical 
direction. 
 
It is interesting that some of these worries find an echo in the section of the questionnaire 
which was answered only by Reporting Officers, i.e. those who carry out staff appraisals. 
Table 6 gives some results. Reporting Officers saw the need for review by their superiors 
in order to secure consistency between Officers. However, they were also uneasy at the 
extent of overruling; they felt that more than mere consistency was involved here. There 
was also a recognition that the new financial link raised problems; fully 33% expressed 
strong agreement with this viewpoint, which implies that the increased difficulties were 
by no means trivial for the Officers concerned. 
 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Our conclusion on this point is that the links between the appraisal system and the 
Revenue's system of Performance Pay in practice seem, to a degree, to have alienated 
many staff. They may well have helped to degrade a system which, for other purposes, 
was entirely suitable. Further, the scepticism which staff were acquiring about the 
integrity of the appraisal system provides an explanation for the very limited motivational 
improvement that Performance Pay induced. 
 
Expectancy theory provides one framework to assist in understanding why the positive 
motivational response to performance related pay in the Revenue was so muted. A second 
framework is given by Goal Setting Theory, which stresses the  virtues of managements 
setting clear, acceptable and achievable work goals (see, for example, Latham and Locke, 
1991). Table 7 sets out some of our results. 
 
 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
These are rather mixed results. Goal setting theory predicts improved performance if 
goals are set more clearly, as long as the goals are agreed and believed to be achievable. 
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The responses to the first statement in Table 7 suggest only a modest improvement in this 
respect; those to the second statement suggest a more widespread improvement. Those to 
the other two statements, however, strongly imply no change. Goals may have become 
clearer but the vast majority of workers felt that they were already working to the 
appropriate standard. This may or not be true in objective terms but even if it is not true, 
our results strongly imply that management had not been able to convince their staff to 
the contrary. Without a commitment to new and more appropriate goals, goal setting 
theory would suggest a zero or very modest impact. 
 
Replies to two further questions support this conclusion. 31% of staff believed that the 
very nature of their job made it hard for them ever to be awarded a Box 1 or 2. In 
addition, no fewer than 46% of the Reporting Officers agreed that staff had insufficent 
control over their work to make performance related pay a sensible idea.  
 
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications. 
 
Our findings in this paper are based on the views of a large and representative survey of 
Inland Revenue staff. To our knowledge, it is the first study of performance related pay of 
its kind for public sector white collar workers in the UK. For this reason alone, it deserves 
to be taken seriously. It is given added importance by the Government's declared intention 
of making performance related pay a more important feature of public sector pay 
arrangements in the future. 
 
Although the principle of relating pay to performance was widely accepted among 
Revenue staff, our results strongly suggest that the system as it operated had, at most, 
only a small positive motivational effect on staff. The small effect was found both in staff 
replies on general motivation, and from detailed questions relating to aspects of work that 
were assessed in the appraisal system. Moreover, the small motivational effect was 
recorded both in the replies of individual members of staff and in the judgments of 
Reporting Officers concerning the behaviour of staff. Finally, these small improvements 
have to be set against certain changes in the other direction. The net effect on staff 
motivation could well have been negative. If motivation was not improved at all 
significantly, or deteriorated, it is hard to see why performance should have been changed 
for the better.
13
 
 
Why should Performance Pay have had so little general effect on motivation when 57% 
the staff reported being favour of the principle? First, and most importantly, it was widely 
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judged to be unfair in its operation. Many staff believed that there was a quota applied to 
the Box markings awarded, and that even if their work performance was good enough, 
they would not be awarded an appropriate Box marking. Indeed, among the latter, 80% 
believed that there was a quota in operation on Box markings. About a third of the staff 
also believed that favouritism influenced Box markings. Objective evidence to support 
staff views on this matter is provided by the fall in the number of Box 1 and 2 markings 
being awarded in the first few years of the new scheme's operation. In this context, it is 
not surprising that staff perceived that the appraisal system had been twisted for purposes 
that had nothing to do with actual performance. 
 
Another cause cited for the feeling of unfairness of operation was that the Box marking 
took insufficient account of job allocations, i.e. of the detailed tasks that different staff 
were required to do. Further, about a third thought that their job gave them little 
opportunity to achieve a Box 1 or 2. The latter view was given support by the replies of 
Reporting Officers. 
 
It might be claimed that, in spite of these findings, Performance Pay had nevertheless 
been a success from management's viewpoint. True, only a small fraction of the staff 
seem to have been stimulated to perform better, but the cost of Performance Pay in terms 
of the fraction of the overall pay bill paid out was also fairly small. In net financial terms, 
it might have 'worked'. This may be correct, and certainly we do not have the data to 
disprove it.  However, one should also consider possible hidden costs in terms of loss of 
motivation elsewhere, and in the damage to established management systems. Three main 
potential costs stand out: possible damage to the work atmosphere; reduced staff 
confidence in the reporting system; and reduced motivation among more senior and 
longer service staff. 
 
Many of our respondents said that Performance Pay caused some deterioration in the 
atmosphere at work, producing a degree of staff jealousies and a decline in morale. 
Erosion of staff confidence in the reporting system is attested by the widespread belief 
that a quota was in operation of Box markings so that no matter how well people worked, 
many would not be given a Performance Pay award. As the reporting system had other 
important uses, including clarifying staff's work objectives, and as high Box markings 
brought intrinsic rewards, its discredit among the staff could have been quite serious in 
the longer run. Finally, as was noted above, longer service staff and those in higher grades 
were more likely than junior staff to indicate 'strong disagreement' with questions on the 
motivational impact of Performance Pay. Although our questions on motivation mainly 
asked whether Performance Pay had increased motivation, and strictly speaking even a 
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strong "no" answer does not imply actual loss of motivation, the possibility seems quite 
serious. 
 
Our results therefore suggest that the system required significant modification if it was to 
realise the full potential of a number of positive features it had in the eyes of staff. Many 
accepted its principle; it led to greater clarity in setting job targets for some staff; and it 
did succeed in motivating at least a minority. Our study indicated that what management 
needed to do in addition was to find some way of overcoming its perceived unfairness of 
operation among staff and to increase the amount of money involved. Both defects 
needed to be tackled simultaneously, as merely increasing the amount of money at stake 
could easily intensify feelings of unfairness. In fact, the scheme was modified very 
substantially in October 1992, after our research was carried out.  
 
The Inland Revenue has now adopted a form of Performance Management which 
involves, inter alia, a new pay structure and grading scheme, and a new process of setting 
annual work targets (where possible of a quantitative form) each year with the individual 
member of staff. At the end of the year a judgment is made by the supervisor as to 
whether the member has met, exceeded or not met the agreed targets. In the 1993 wage 
round, staff members who were judged not to have met their targets received only the 
basic 1.5% increase in pay; those who met their targets got between 2.2% and 10%, 
depending on where they were in the new pay structure; those who exceeded their targets 
got even more, at least 2.7%. In the event, over 90% of staff were judged to have met 
their targets. On the basis of the first year's experience, therefore, any performance related 
pay quota would seem to be a thing of the past, and the sense of unfairness surrounding 
the system of relating pay to performance could, consequently, have been diminished. On 
the other hand, if more than 90% of staff get the standard performance payment, its 
incentive effect must also become diminished by being seen as close to automatic.  
 
The new scheme's first year of operation might not be typical, however. There is, for 
example, already more than a suggestion that staff members' targets were ratcheted up at 
the end of the first year, implying that staff might well have to work progressively harder 
to earn any performance element in year two. The implication is that the scheme is 
evidently still evolving, and will repay further evaluation in the near future.  
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Endnotes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  We would like to thank the IRSF for financial assistance in carrying out the research 
reported here, and Clive Brooke, Lorraine Denoris and Jim McAuslan of the IRSF for 
their guidance, time and patience. We also wish to thank the Inland Revenue management 
for their advice, and help in conducting the survey. They are in no way implicated in what 
follows. 
 
2. Recent evaluations of managerial staff in the UK include Bevan and Thompson (1992) 
on local authority managers (but with a view primarily to equal opportunities), and 
studies in Australia reviewed by Wood (1991), the US (Milkovitch and Wigdor 1991), 
and across a wider range of countries (Wood and Maguire 1993). 
 
3. For a fuller version of the survey results, and details of the questionnaire, see Marsden 
and Richardson (1992). 
 
4. More precisely, the 1988 Agreement led to its introduction for the staff grades covered 
in our analysis; these refer to virtually all the Revenue staff but exclude the most senior 
staff.  
 
5. Under the agreement with the IRSF, there were in fact two pay spines, A and B, which 
were staggered, so that the equivalent of a half increment in some other pay systems was 
achieved by movement to the next highest point of the other spine. Thus Box 1s were 
rewarded with a linear upward progression along their current pay spine, whereas Box 2s 
progressed by zig-zagging between the two spines. 
 
6. Over time, staff could combine performance awards for Box 1s and two consecutive 
Box 2s, but could not obtain more than three awards on each criterion, subject to the 
maximum additional reward under Performance Pay of three range points up the spine 
containing the member of staff's scale maximum. 
 
7. Even then, Reporting Officers were not required to give an overall Box marking that 
was a simple average of the individual elements. Not only could certain elements be 
given a higher weight than others, additional factors could be taken into account. 
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8. It is also in principle possible that an award could have made the difference between 
someone staying in the Revenue and leaving -- this was not something we were able to 
explore. 
 
9. We subsequently approached the Inland Revenue official side to ask whether they 
wished to make it a jointly sponsored union-management study. The official side chose 
not to participate, but they did provide a great deal of valuable help with background 
information, and they cooperated fully with the research. In particular, they agreed to 
draw the sample to our specifications from their personnel records, and they distributed 
the questionnaires through their internal mailing service. The authors would like to 
express their very sincere thanks to the official side for all their assistance. 
 
10. In our questionnaire, we asked for responses on a five point scale, from strongly 
disagree, to disagree, to no view, to agree and to strongly agree. For convenience of 
presentation, we have combined strongly disagree with disagree, and strongly agree with 
agree. We have also ignored the 'no views', so that the percentages do not add up to 100. 
Finally, the statements in the Tables do not always correspond word for word with those 
in the questionnaire, again for convenience of expression. 
 
11  See Marsden and Richardson (1992) for the detailed results by type of employee. 
  
12. These figures were published in IRSF Assessment Pay Special, September, 1991. 
 
13. It is sometimes argued that management may not change payment systems in order to 
raise motivation as such, but to signal a change in management style and work objectives, 
and to encourage staff to alter their work in an appropriate way. It could be argued that 
the role of performance pay in the Citizens' Charter was just this, to signal a change of 
orientation to public servants, that they should become more sensitive to the needs of 
ordinary citizens, and provide them better value for money. Our research did not address 
this issue directly. However, our findings suggest that the scheme has not reinforced the 
position of management, as reporting officers said they found that performance pay had 
made appraisal, an important means by which they can influence staff performance, more 
difficult (Tables 5 and 6). Secondly, our general findings in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that 
the scheme itself had little effect in inciting staff to work more according to the canons of 
the Citizens' Charter. 
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Table 1. Inland Revenue staff views on the principle of performance related pay  
 
 
 percentages 
 
 Agree Disagree 
 
Performance Pay is good in principle  57 40 
 
On balance, for all its faults, it is 
better to have Performance Pay than not 49 44 
 
The idea of Performance Pay is 
fundamentally unfair  36 58 
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Table 2. Staff assessment of their own motivational responses to Performance Pay. 
 
 
 Percentages 
 
Performance Pay has led you to: 
 Agree Disagree 
 
improve the quality of your work  12 80 
 
increase the quantity of your work  14 78 
 
work harder  9 71 
  
work beyond the job requirements  21 70 
 
give sustained high performance  27 63 
 
improve your priorities at work  22 64 
 
show more initiative  27 61 
 
express yourself with greater clarity  13 67 
 
be more effective in dealing with the public 9 68 
 
improve your sensitivity towards colleagues 14 63 
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Table 3. The views of Reporting Officers on the impact of Performance Pay on their staff. 
 
 
 percentages 
  
 
 Agree Disagree 
 
Performance Pay has caused many staff to  
work beyond the requirements of their job  15 79 
 
Performance Pay has led many staff to give 
sustained high performance at work  14 77 
 
Performance Pay has helped to increase the 
quality of the work of many staff  10 82 
 
Performance Pay has led to an increase in the 
quantity of the work of many staff  22 71 
 
Performance Pay has made many staff more 
committed to their work  12 79 
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Table 4. Staff views on the effects of Performance Pay on staff as a whole. 
 
 percentages 
 
 Agree Disagree 
 
Performance Pay has helped to undermine 
staff morale  55 25 
 
Performance Pay has caused jealousies 
betwen staff   62 21 
 
Performance Pay has made staff less 
willing to assist colleagues  26 53 
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Table 5. Staff views on the Revenue's appraisal system. 
 
 
 percentages 
 
 Agree Disagree 
 
Performance Pay has made staff question 
the fairness of the appraisal system  87 5 
 
Staff are frequently denied the Box Marking 
they deserve because of a quota system  74 10 
 
A good appraisal is too often overruled 
by someone higher up  63 16 
 
People get a good Box Marking not so much because 
of their performance but because managers 
want to reward their favourites  35 45 
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Table 6. Reporting Officer views on the appraisal system. 
 
 
 percentages 
 
 Agree Disagree 
 
The vetting of reports higher up is necessary  
to ensure consistency between  
Reporting Officers  77 16 
 
Performance Pay has made Reporting Officers  
feel uneasy because their assessments are  
overruled by someone higher up  60 28 
 
Performance Pay has made the appraisal system 
harder to operate because it is now tied  
to money  72 23 
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Table 7. Staff views on work goals. 
 
 
 percentages 
 
 Agree Disagree 
 
Performance Pay has made supervisors 
set work targets more clearly  27 43 
 
Performance Pay has raised staff awareness 
of the appraisal system's objectives  57 30 
 
Performance Pay has had no effect on the 
quality of my work because it was already 
at the appropriate standard  82 8 
 
Communications between staff and 
management have improved as a result of 
Performance Pay  9 72 
 
 
 
 
